

# Lessons for Myanmar's Transitional Justice Measures in Post-Conflict Period through Reflection in Cambodia's and Nepal's Transitional Justice Practices

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## Key Findings:

- **Accountability:** Myanmar must establish a robust legal framework to prosecute all levels of perpetrators, avoiding Cambodia's focus on high-level offenders and Nepal's systemic failures.
- **Truth-Seeking:** A dedicated Truth and Reconciliation Commission is essential for comprehensive documentation, learning from Cambodia's limited truth collection and Nepal's failed commissions.
- **Amnesties:** Myanmar should strictly regulate amnesties to avoid impunity, as both Cambodia and Nepal faced criticism for granting undue pardons.
- **Victim-Centered Approach:** Inclusive participation of victims in hearings, reparations, and reconciliation processes is vital to ensure justice and healing.
- **International Support:** Collaboration with international bodies can provide resources, impartiality, and accountability, critical for Myanmar's transitional justice.
- **Avoiding Political Interference:** Safeguarding justice mechanisms from political manipulation is crucial to their success.

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## **Abstract**

Transitional justice system is a crucial requirement in Myanmar's post-conflict scenario, holding perpetrators of all levels accountable for their war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocidal acts and human rights violations to seek justice for victim communities. This study aims to provide relevant and most important recommendations for Myanmar's transitional justice measures in post-conflict by learning from its close neighbors such as Cambodia and Nepal. Analyses are made from primary sources of government records, legal documents and reports from international organizations and also secondary ones such as scholarly academic articles to supplement primary analysis. The study discusses that Myanmar should be conscientious with developing transitional justice measures for all levels of perpetrators from the Tatmadaw to revolutionary forces and with defining amnesties and pardons for high-level perpetrators while establishing an independent truth and reconciliation commission, in order to ensure transitional justice for victims, through deliberating on transitional justice experiences of Cambodia and Nepal. These analyses suggest that

implementing a comprehensive framework of transitional justice will ensure proper prosecution for perpetrators and justice and reparation for victims.

***Keywords: transitional justice, perpetrator, victim, amnesties, Tatmadaw, Myanmar, Cambodia, Nepal***

## **Introduction**

Since the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021, Myanmar has seen escalating armed conflicts between the Tatmadaw and revolutionary armed forces and a civil war is still ongoing. Myanmar is expected to implement transitional justice measures for perpetrators in the post-conflict period and in doing so, it is vital to learn lessons from previous transitional justice measures in other countries, especially countries in the same continent Asia such as Cambodia and Nepal in order to avoid unjust transitional justice mechanisms, be able to seek truths and justice for victims and to hold all levels of perpetrators accountable for their own atrocities and crimes against humanity without any exceptions.

Cambodia, being Myanmar's nearest ASEAN friend and Nepal, being a close

Asia neighbor, which have to a certain extent similar political, economic and religious practices, are great examples for Myanmar to learn from their mistakes, transitional justice mechanisms, and weaknesses and strengths so as to implement effective transitional justice measures against the perpetrators, especially in two areas such as prosecution and truth-seeking.

### **Research Problem**

In the present civil war of Myanmar, there are many armed conflicts in various forms happening in all ethnic villages and areas across the country, resulting that there have been hundred cases of human rights violations, war crimes, crimes against humanities and human rights violations across the country starting from Arakan State to northern Shan and Karen States because of current armed clashes between the Tatmadaw and revolutionary armed organizations. These two main bodies seem to be primary perpetrators who are directly engaged in violent activities, and the victims of all conflicts are the people who range from ethnic majorities and minorities to people from rural and urban areas.

In the post-conflict period, Myanmar needs to implement a just transitional justice mechanism for all these violence

and armed activities which negatively impacted ethnic groups and individuals. For this, it is crucial to point out what fair practices of transitional justice mechanisms and measures should be for the Myanmar case by taking lessons from nearby countries such as Cambodia and Nepal.

This study aims to provide proper recommendations for Myanmar in developing transitional justice measures in the post-conflict period.

### **Research Objectives**

- ❖ To examine relevant lessons from Cambodia's and Nepal's transitional justice mechanisms, and their strengths and weaknesses for consideration in Myanmar's future transitional justice measures,
- ❖ To learn effective transitional justice measures for Myanmar in the post-conflict period

The research questions are:

- ❖ What does Myanmar need to learn from Cambodia's and Nepal's transitional justice practices?
- ❖ How does Myanmar implement a transitional justice system in post-conflict situations?

## Methodology

The methodology is based on primary sources such as legal and policy documents, and government reports and records as well as reports from international organizations to investigate the facts about Cambodia's and Nepal's transitional justice system closely. These primary sources provided the foundation for the study's arguments and analysis based on concrete evidence. Secondary sources, including scholarly academic journal articles, were used to supplement primary sources and analytical context for discussion. The study employed a qualitative approach, analyzing gathered evidence of primary sources and also secondary sources to address research questions and to achieve objectives. This approach enabled a thorough examination over the lessons that Myanmar should learn from Cambodia's and Nepal's transitional justice systems for its own post-conflict scenario.

Cambodia and Nepal are specifically selected for comparative analysis because these two countries faced similar civil wars and armed conflicts with consequences of gross human rights violations, crimes against humanity, war crimes and political interference in the post-state building

just like Myanmar nowadays. These similarities are worthy of taking lessons from their transitional justice experiences in Myanmar.

Moreover, this study focuses only on analyzing two transitional justice measures such as prosecution and truth-seeking for Myanmar's post-conflict transitional justice mechanism by learning from Cambodia and Nepal.

## **Cambodia's Transitional Justice Measures towards 1975-1979 Khmer Rouge**

The Khmer Rouge occurred under the communist leadership of Pol Pot in 1975-1979 who wanted to transform Cambodia into a self-sufficient society. The Communist Party of Kampuchea exercised criminal policies that forcibly drove people in urban areas into rural areas to work in agricultural sites and industrial zones, and asked them to meet impossible rates of output in a short time. People suffered continuous drought, starvation, food shortages, insufficient shelter and unsafe working environments. A genocidal regime killed around 1.7 million, one-fourth of the Cambodian population, in less than four years (ECCC, 2024).

In the context of Cambodia, primary perpetrators were high-ranking officers who permitted, instructed and ordered the murders towards regime betrayers, mid-level perpetrators were those who planned the killing and torture and may have engaged in direct activities, and low-level perpetrators were those at the community or grassroots levels who executed the murders and committed crimes directly towards victims, e.g. security forces and work brigade leaders (Carrim, 2020).

Victim groups included former Khmer Republic officials, soldiers and their families, Buddhists and monks, Cham ethnic and Muslim religious minorities, ethnic Vietnamese, Khmer Krom, and other groups such as Thai, and foreign returnees. Atrocities committed were political, religious, and racial persecutions, genocide, extermination, murder, torture, imprisonment, enslavement, forced transfer, forced disappearances, forced marriage, rape, and deportation (ECCC, 2024) which fall under the categories of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (United Nations, 1999).

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, is the primary trial body which was established in 2006 as a hybrid international court of

local and international judges to prosecute the highest-ranking leaders of the Khmer Rouge for atrocities committed (ECCC, 2024) which has been a significant weakness of legislation of ECCC because it ignored holding mid and low-level perpetrators accountable for their crimes.

Since 2006, ECCC tried 4 cases in total till nowadays – case 001 with the life imprisonment of Kaing Guek Eav for his crimes against humanity at S-21 Security Centre (ECCC, 2010), case 002/01 with the life imprisonment of Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan for their genocidal crimes against humanity at Toul Po Chrey execution site against Muslim Cham and Vietnamese minorities (ECCC, 2014), and case 002/02 with case dismissal for Ieng Sary and his wife Ieng Thirith for their severe health conditions despite evidence of their crimes (ECCC, 2018), and cases 003 of Meas Muth and Sou Met and 004 of Yim Tith were dismissed because of several disagreements that they were not high ranking leaders and are not responsible (ECCC, 2021 & 2019). In all these cases, ECCC allows civil parties' and victims' participation in proceedings where victims have the opportunity to uncover truths and give their honest confessions against accused persons.

In measuring ECCC's trial success, there is a variety of debate such that only two senior leaders were held accountable for their crimes even though there are still many out there living free from their own crimes and gaining impunities. Despite ECCC being a useful court and initiative for holding perpetrators accountable for their crimes, its trials have not been considerable in numbers because of internal illiberal political plays at ECCC (Gidley, 2019). Moreover, ECCC does not hold mid-level and low-level perpetrators accountable for their crimes (Budak, 2020), which has been a constant failure in Cambodia's transitional justice system because these perpetrators were those who executed crimes of murder, imprisonment, torture, and forced disappearances by their hands at execution sites and camps (Meirio, 2010). The call for holding these mid and low-level perpetrators has always been a major challenge for Cambodia's transitional justice success and Cambodia's trials did not hold all levels of perpetrators at courts of weak legislation, resulting in automatic impunities for these perpetrators.

Besides its main responsibility of prosecution and trials, its another duty is to document truths about the incidents, provide justice for victims

and contribute to reconciliation and healing. The Cambodian government does not separately establish a particular truth-seeking institution such as the truth commission like in South Africa, for proper documentation of truths and confessions. Even though ECCC was formed with a mission of truth collection, it concentrated more on holding accountable and prosecuting senior leaders of atrocities rather than documentation of truths from both perpetrators and victims, and collected truths from cases only, causing the rest of the truths untold (McCargo, 2015). Despite the absence of a particular truth commission, the ECCC, civil society organizations, and international organizations conducted truth-seeking projects and documented survivor testimonies, historical records, and academic research. And even though the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General of Human Rights in Cambodia encouraged Cambodia to establish a truth commission in his 1996 report, it was not founded separately (ECCC, 2024). Therefore, still the absence of a truth commission has always been a gap in Cambodia's transitional justice system for comprehensive and multifaceted truth-seeking success.

In terms of amnesties, in 1994, the Cambodia government passed one



legislation to ban the Khmer Rouge and provide an amnesty of 6 months to Rouge Guerrillas to return to the Kingdom (Budak, 2020) and in 1996, the King issued the amnesty to Ieng Sary, former Deputy Prime Minister of the Khmer Rouge according to Article 27 of the 1993 Cambodia Constitution (Slye, 2012).

Article 40 of ECCC Law and Article 11 of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia prohibit granting amnesties and pardons to those who committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in accordance with the Geneva Conventions (ECCC, 2024) but the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (2001) states that perpetrators who gained amnesty before the establishment of ECCC are not subject to ECCC's jurisdiction, meaning that even if found guilty, they cannot be held accountable or prosecuted. Consequently, Ieng Sary, with a pre-existing amnesty by the 1996 Royal Decree, was not held accountable by the Trial Chamber despite evidence when he was tried for his committed atrocities at the ECCC (Budak, 2020).

Even so, ECCC's Tribunal Statute has the power to review the 1996 amnesty and reviewed the amnesty of Ieng Sary but not the 1994 amnesty which allowed many Khmer Rouge Subordinates to be free from ECCC's jurisdiction and they still enjoy impunities from their crimes (Slye, 2012). Slye (2012) also argues that the Cambodian amnesties lack justice restoration for victims, perpetrators' accountability, and recognition of victims' sufferings because only a few high-ranking and primary perpetrators are held accountable but mid- and low-level perpetrators are not and gain impunities from their crimes which has been a constant unsolved weakness of Cambodia's TJ system over the years.

Cambodia, regardless of other failures and challenges in transitional justice mechanisms, does not also seem to not provide promising reconciliation and justice for victim populations, and its trials, truth commissions, and amnesties provision hinder the importance of community reconciliation, reparation for victims and seeking transitional justice because many perpetrators are till nowadays free from their accountabilities to their past crimes against humanity and genocidal acts. Rather than significant success, Cambodia seemingly faced numerous criticisms from victims and

international communities for its ineffectiveness and inefficiency in its transitional justice mechanisms.

## **Nepal's Transitional Justice Measures towards 10-Year Civil War**

Nepal encountered a brutal civil war in 1996-2006 for one decade between the Nepal government and the Maoist rebels, caused primarily by economic crisis and political democratic instability. The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN Maoist) argued that the government was failing to address economic issues and extreme poverty for the people while also its democratic stability was collapsing (Sharma & Gibson, 2023; Do & Iyer, 2009).

According to Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2007) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2012), the war brought around 13,000 deaths and 1,300 disappearances, and children were worrisomely primary victims exposed by both the government and CPN Maoist for being recruited forcibly for child soldiers, losing education and healthcare while families and homes were destroyed, and extreme poverty even got more extreme, and so did

economic problems amidst armed conflicts.

The CPN Maoists and the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) and Security Forces were the primary perpetrators; the former responsible for launching armed insurgency in 1996, mass killings and public torture of civilians, forced recruitment of child soldiers and forced disappearances; and later for unlawful killings, arbitrary arrests and forced disappearances of anyone suspected of Maoist sympathies, and mass human rights violations (HRW, 2007; OHCHR, 2012).

The victims were Nepalese civilians; children were forced to become child soldiers for maoists rebels; forced disappearances, especially Tulasia Pathak, were committed by both CPN and RNA, and the Dalits were main victims of massacres in rural and marginalized areas by both parties. The total death was around 13,000 and forced disappearances, 1300 undocumented, and more than 8,000 were severely injured or physically disabled (HRW, 2007; OHCHR, 2012; Adhikari, 2019).

Nepal started its transitional justice mechanisms in 2015 founded by the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Accord after the end of civil war in 2006, and established two ad hoc institutions: the



Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission on the Investigation of Enforced Disappearances of Persons (CIEDP) in 2015 to facilitate transitional justice processes as mandated by the 2014 Transitional Justice Act (Singh, 2019; Bhandari, 2015).

TRC and CIEDP were infamous for its in operation and failures to hold perpetrators accountable for their atrocities and seek justice for victims because of the lack of transparency and independence in its legal activities, and of political interests and interference in the bodies (Trial International, 2019a; Singh, 2019). United Nations Human Rights Committee (2019) condemned that the Nepal government does not make any efforts to hold perpetrators accountable but instead provides total and near impunity to them while ignoring victims' human rights and making no reparations. As of 2019, a single perpetrator of international crimes against humanity and human rights violations was not tried at national courts while on the other hand, members of TRC and CIEDP were continuously chosen for political interests, resulting that numerous complaints and cases received are still unaddressed till nowadays (Trial International, 2019b). Despite continued mandates of the TRC and

CIEDP over the years, both failed to execute responsible investigations to deliver justice for victims, not to mention truth, reparation and reconciliation. Moreover, victims do not achieve justice from national courts when they report their cases but instead perpetrators who held high positions in Maoist rebels and the Nepal government are still free of their crimes and enjoy impunity (Rausch, 2017; Sharma, 2017). Neither primary and low-level perpetrators were held accountable for their atrocities and war crimes (Dixit, 2022; OHCHR, 2012), and Dixit (2022) even added that victims face transitional injustice from national TJ bodies.

Concerning amnesty and impunity, Nepal's 2014 Transitional Justice Act included the provision of amnesties for even those with gross human rights violations and crimes such as rape, torture and enforced disappearances. Despite the Supreme Court striking down the amnesties in 2015, most alleged perpetrators who were either high-position holders or low-level officers continued to enjoy amnesty and impunity, protected by the courts (Trial International, 2016). For example, Resham Chaudhary, who committed a grave human rights crime in 2015 Tikapur carnage, was granted amnesty by the Nepali President Ramchandra

Poudel under Article 276 of the Constitution which allows the president to grant pardons to any sentence passed by any courts (Bhatta, 2023), and so were impunities given to respectively Ramesh Swar, former army captain and Ajit Thapa, former army major (Human Rights Watch, 2024). The issue of amnesties and impunity has been a major point of contention and both the government, the courts and the Transitional Justice Act are severely criticized for failing to seek transitional justice and truths for victim communities, to prosecute high and low-level perpetrators for their crimes, and to prevent political interests and interference in transitional justice mechanisms (Ganguly, 2023; International Center for Transitional Justice, 2011).

In Nepal's transitional justice system, the 2014 Transitional Justice Act plays an important role in accelerating TJ measures for perpetrators. The Act, besides providing amnesties to high and low-level perpetrators, contradicts international laws for serious crimes such as torture, rape, forced disappearances, sexual exploitation and child soldiers (Human Rights Watch, 2023; Amnesty International 2023). The Supreme Court, despite its attempt to override this provision in 2015, failed to uphold perpetrators accountable for

their atrocities and prosecute them. The government did not welcome victims and their voices and participation in transitional justice legislation and provided amnesties in several ways based on their political interests (Ganguly, 2023). Then, new amendments for transitional justice bill were proposed to Nepal parliaments in 2022 and 2023 and not approved yet; however, these amendments are being criticized for not meeting Nepal's domestic and international law obligations for human rights standards, and even expands the scope of violations eligible for amnesties (International Commission of Jurists, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2023; Amnesty International 2023).

In transitional justice systems across the world, Nepal is well known for its provision of amnesties and impunities to alleged perpetrators while at the same time, its legal institutions such as TRC, CIEDP and courts do not address victims' complaints and prosecute perpetrators for their crimes because they are being played by political interests and interference to undermine transitional justice measures in restoring justice, reconciliation building, provision of reparation and truth seeking. Even nowadays, since 2006, after 18 years, Nepal does not seem to have achieved these four TJ

successes rather than protecting perpetrators.

## **Findings and Discussion**

### **Lessons from Cambodia and Nepal for Myanmar's post-conflict transitional justice measures**

At the current civil war in Myanmar, the Tatmadaw is the primary perpetrator committed gross human rights violations and abuses, war crimes and crimes against humanity in especially Arakan State, Chin State, Karen State, Magway Region and Shan State, which could also be presumingly committed by revolutionary armed forces such as People's Defense Forces (PDFs), and ethnic armed organizations (Amnesty International, 2023). From top generals to local informers, high-level, mid-level and low-level (community) perpetrators from both Tatmadaw, including Pyusawhtee forces, and revolutionary armed forces should be held accountable in post-conflict transitional justice. However, the question whether the crimes committed by the revolutionary forces should be ignored or considered for transitional justice efforts remains unaddressed even though local and international communities urge that the

Tatmadaw must be wholly held accountable and responsible for their atrocities and war crimes.

According to Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma (2024), the Tatmadaw committed human rights violations in several categories such as killings with air strikes, heavy artillery, gun, bombs and landmines, using civilians as human shields in armed conflicts, burning down whole villages, and rape cases of underage girls across the country, recently in Saw township, Magway region and Tabayin and Myinmu townships, Sagaing region, and Butidaung and Maungdaw in Arakan State. In December 2023, the war between the Tatmadaw and the Three Brotherhood Alliance of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army resulted in displacement of 600,000 people across the country (Human Rights Watch, 2024), and the Tatmadaw killed plenty of civilians in airstrikes in northern Shan State (Shan Human Rights Foundation, 2023).

Victims do not just face displacement issues but also deal with plenty of war-affected consequences such as sexual violence, torture, genocidal acts, and rapes as well as losing the access to health and medical care, psychological

support, legal assistance, livelihood opportunities and accommodation. These victims' sufferings should not be pushed aside for any reasons in transitional justice efforts of Myanmar, which is why lessons from close neighbors such as Cambodia and Nepal are of vital importance.

First lesson is, the Cambodia ECCC focused only on high-level perpetrators, leaving mid- and low-level perpetrators unaccountable for their crimes which did not ensure transitional justice for victims. On the other hand, Nepal did not even have a particular tribunal as the same as the Cambodia ECCC and instead, local courts acted as tribunals but failed to address victims' reports and protected perpetrators out of political interests. Therefore, it is of paramount importance for Myanmar to establish a comprehensive legal framework and a specific ad hoc tribunal to hold perpetrators of all levels accountable for their crimes by preventing impunities and amnesties for their gross human rights violations, and also by preventing political interests from interfering with the TJ system.

Secondly, Nepal established a separate Truth and Reconciliation Commission to collect truths, confessions and stories from victims and perpetrators to seek

justice whilst Cambodia did not have one and instead the ECCC was in charge for truth seeking activities which in fact limited truths collection and documentation from victims' communities due to its aggregate responsibilities of prosecution, reparation, and truth collection. In the Myanmar scenario, human rights violations and crimes seem to be numerous and nationwide so that the establishment of a dedicated Truth and Reconciliation Commission is essential to achieve proper documentation of truths from victims and perpetrators themselves.

Moreover, in both Cambodia and Nepal, the provision of amnesties and impunities for perpetrators of all levels was infamous by various means of royal decree, presidential decree, local courts, political interference and Transitional Justice Act which has been a topic of contention and viewed as a failure to deliver transitional justice to the victim community. Myanmar must be cautious of providing amnesties and impunities to especially high-level perpetrators for their crimes against humanity, war crimes and human rights abuses, and it is a major deliberation to define scope and conditions of any amnesties.

Additionally, in Nepal, victims' voices were largely ignored in its transitional

justice processes ranging from TRC and CIEDP to local and supreme courts while there were some considerations in Cambodia ECCC's proceedings. Incorporating victim participation in transitional justice procedures play an important role for delivering justice as a means of reparation and community reconciliation which is also a lesson for Myanmar's post-conflict period because most human rights violations are incurred towards local ethnic communities at communities level and rural villages by soldiers, police, local informers and revolutionary forces.

Most importantly, political interference was the main driver for failures of TJ mechanisms in Cambodia and Nepal. In Myanmar's case, it could possibly become a contentious point, especially when transitional justice measures are defined and considered for revolutionary armed forces for their in-war human rights violations and crimes. It could lead to either total provision of amnesties and impunities for their restorative justice efforts or mild and severe legal charges. However, the question whether revolutionary armed forces are to be held accountable for their human rights violations in the civil war or not still remains unanswered.

From Nepal's transitional justice experience, the civil war ended in 2006 and it took 9 years to initiate transitional justice measures for perpetrators which gave them enough time to seek alternative ways to avoid the penalty and gain impunities. It is really important for Myanmar and responsible bodies to be well prepared before and after the conflict ends, and not to take the same steps of delaying TJ measures because of political power struggles between and among political parties such as EAOs and National Unity Government (NUG). Otherwise, victims will face transitional injustice. In fact, Nepal lacked preparedness from its decade-long civil for its post-war state building which was the primary driver for failures in holding perpetrators accountable for their crimes and establishing a comprehensive and legally binding trial framework for all levels of perpetrators, which should not happen similarly for Myanmar.

From Cambodia's experience as well, the involvement of international communities in the TJ system through a hybrid ECCC of both local and international judges helped maintain a degree of impartiality and credibility in its TJ activities despite political intervention undermining the system. Moreover, the TJ efforts demand high

costs and plenty of funds to seek justice through a costly procedure. Therefore, the collaboration with international communities to ensure restoration of justice to victims, seek truths and provision of reparations is incredibly crucial so that impartiality, transparency and accountability can be attained through intergovernmental cooperation for Myanmar's TJ systems.

Several relevant lessons and transitional justice experiences from Cambodia and Nepal are worthy of consideration in developing Myanmar's TJ measures, given the facts that these two countries hold somewhat similar diversity in ethnicities, languages, political history and social issues.

## **Recommendation**

Following the analysis of Cambodia and Nepal's transitional justice mechanisms, it is evident that this study alone cannot encompass the entire scope required to achieve a comprehensive transitional justice for victims in post-conflict Myanmar which is why further research is encouraged to fill this gap. Based on transitional justice experiences of Cambodia and Nepal, the following recommendations are proposed for Myanmar:

- ❖ To develop a comprehensive legal framework for holding all levels of perpetrators accountable for their crimes
- ❖ To establish an independent truth and reconciliation commission to document the whole picture of human rights violations and war crimes
- ❖ To deliberate on terms and conditions for provision of amnesties and impunities, especially towards high-ranking perpetrators
- ❖ To enhance victim participation in hearings, proceedings, legal structures and reparations through a victim-centered approach
- ❖ To allow civil society organizations in collecting truths and confessions, especially at grassroots communities
- ❖ To establish ad hoc courts and tribunals with both local and international juries to seek transitional justice for victims to show transparency and accountability
- ❖ To recognize international support and technical assistance in making transitional justice measures transparent and impartial



These recommendations aim to shed light on Myanmar in developing an effective and comprehensive transitional justice system, learning from successes and shortcomings of Cambodia and Nepal. By ensuring a promising transitional justice system, Myanmar can better secure justice, reconciliation and long-term peace.

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